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Abstract: The sixtieth anniversary of the 1956 crisis in international communism 
provoked a fresh wave of comment on its British dimensions and coincided with the 
declassification of MI5 files on party historians Edward Thompson and Rodney 
Hilton. This article approaches the question of communist commitment through a 
reinterpretation of the Reasoner controversy in which Thompson and Hilton were to 
different degrees involved. First, it uses the MI5 material alongside existing sources 
to illuminate tactical and political aspects of the engagement between the Reasoner 
editors and the party leadership, placing emphasis on the Reasoner’s role as 
bridgehead of an attempt to reform the party from within rather than as simply a 
precursor to the New Left.. Next, interrogating Thompson’s claim to ‘communist 
principle’, it compares his developing interpretation of what this meant and required 
with the views of a selection of other intellectuals. Far from representing a 
straightforward assertion of moral conscience against monolithic party bureaucracy, 
the Reasoner controversy reveals an extremely complex picture of the tensions and 
constraints involved in communist commitment. 
 
 
‘I know very well that the knots tied by Stalinism cannot be untied in a day. 
But the first step on the road back to Communist principle is that we tell the 
truth and show confidence in the judgement of the people.’2 
 
 
Release in September 2016 of a new tranche of files on ‘communists and suspected 
communists’ by the British Security Service (MI5) attracted a modest flurry of 
publicity.  Although the release included files on individuals more central to the 
Communist Party’s British operations, it was Edward Thompson’s sharp critique of 
the CPGB leadership, made some months before his suspension then resignation in 
November 1956, at the height of the Party crisis touched off by the Khrushchev 
‘revelations’ about Stalin’s leadership, that attracted most notice. ‘It is difficult to 
argue with his claim’, remarked Professor Christopher Andrew, introducing the files 
for the National Archives, ‘that the leaders of the British Communist Party had “been 
acting as High Priests, interpreting and justifying the Holy Writ as emanating from 
Stalin, rather than creative Marxists striving to form an independent analysis of the 
situation on the basis of their examination of the evidence’.3  Andrew did not mention 
that the vehemence of the critique expressed by Thompson in the intercepted letter he 
quoted (written to Bert Ramelson, Chair of the Yorkshire District Committee on 
which Thompson also served) led David Haldane Porter, head of MI5’s F branch, to 
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alert John Rennie, chief of the Information Research Department (IRD) to its 
contents. ‘Most interesting. Some good arguments here for the IRD’ records Haldane 
Porter’s handwritten note on the file coversheet, and he duly passed on excerpts, 
cautioning that the ‘secret and delicate means’ by which the information had been 
obtained restricted its use to paraphrase only.4  
 
The IRD was a covert unit set up to disseminate anti-communist propaganda 
through the mainstream media.5 Recipient of Orwell’s famous ‘list’, its officials knew 
the value of an intellectual prepared to denounce communism. Their interest in 
Thompson is a reminder that the Cold War remains an indispensable context for 
understanding the CPGB’s 1956 crisis, both as it was experienced and as it has been 
interpreted since. If there are always those for whom the latest anniversary provides 
an opportunity to indulge the ‘end of history smugness’ that marks much coverage of 
communism and its British adherents, it is also true that 1956 remains an interpretive 
battleground for the left.6 Themes reprised in the latest round of commemoration 
include the prominence of intellectuals, particularly the party historians’ group, in the 
revolt that saw the CPGB lose some 9000 members, and the extent to which pre-
existing modes of intellectual critique, especially the development of ‘cultural 
Marxism’, prepared the ground for dissent.7 There has also been renewal of a strand 
of argument pointing to the moral arbitrariness of 1956 as the moment when 
communists located their consciences.8 
 
The story of the Reasoner, the unauthorized inner-party journal produced by 
Thompson and John Saville from July-November 1956 as locus for a freer discussion 
of the implications of the Khrushchev disclosures than the CPGB leadership would 
allow, is pivotal to these discussions. Usually presented retrospectively as the 
mouthpiece of a principled moral revolt of party intellectuals and precursor to the 
early New Left, its role as bridgehead of an attempt to reform the party from within is 
not always well understood.  Thompson, certainly, with his repeated later invocation 
of 1956 as an historical as well as personal watershed, his insistence on the need 
regularly to ‘beat the boundaries’ of 1956, and his eventual, unassailable reputation as 
exemplary public moralist, himself contributed much to support a reading of the 
Reasoner as repository of party conscience and midwife of ‘socialist humanism’. 
Thompson and Saville’s stance is also often taken as representative of the Communist 
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Party historians’ group to which they both belonged, conferring a retrospective unity 
on that group and marking it as a centre of dissidence in the tumult of the year, by 
Hobsbawm’s account an immediate ‘nucleus of vocal opposition to the Party line’.9 
The most persistent challenge to these predominant interpretations has been made 
from a perspective broadly sympathetic to a Trotskyist reading of Communist history. 
In 1980 Perry Anderson countered Thompson’s anti-Althusserianism in The Poverty 
of Theory (’Where was Althusser in 1956?’) pointing to the wide availability of 
information about the trials and purges, and of Trotskyist analysis of Stalinism well 
before 1956. Yet only after confirmation ex-cathedra did the dissidents of 1956 take 
action: ‘Is the official announcement of Stalin’s crimes then to mark the frontier 
between venial and mortal responsibility?’ he pointedly asked.10  The recent welcome 
republication of the three issues of The Reasoner in book form is accompanied by a 
set of critical essays in broadly similar vein. Recognising their ‘exemplary and 
memorable’ role in 1956, John McIlroy and Paul Flewers argue that the Reasoner 
editors nevertheless  (and in different ways) achieved only an incomplete break with 
‘Stalinism’ and subsequently failed to provide the Marxist explanation of it that they 
recognized as a necessity.11 
 
This critique is useful, not least for its recognition of some differences in 
outlook between Thompson and Saville, even at the point of their closest 
collaboration. It is certainly true too that Stalin’s ‘knots’ (as Thompson said in 1956) 
would not ‘be untied in a day’ and his own later presentations would sometimes 
simplify and abbreviate the attempt. Interrogating the reliability and consistency of 
first person accounts by Thompson, Hobsbawm and others also prompts useful 
reflection on the extent to which reliance on retrospective accounts from participants 
has encouraged an implicit teleology in historical presentations of the crisis, 
something worthy of fuller reflection.12 Yet if this strand of argument can help correct 
overly simplistic readings of the Reasoner episode, to the extent that it resolves into a 
broader argument about the limitations of the later New Left as reparable by fuller 
and earlier engagement with British Trotskyism, it has its own questionable 
teleology.13 
 
The release of MI5 files on Thompson and Hilton, added to those of 
prominent party intellectuals already available, provides a fresh set of primary sources 
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and renewed opportunity to consider these issues in their context, while the 
Thompson material has extra significance given the continued embargo on his 
papers.14 These files do though present problems as sources for historians interested in 
the human subjects of surveillance rather than its techniques and policy contexts. The 
secret, partial and incomplete nature of the material, retention or redaction of 
documents, and the difficulty in many cases of cross-checking against other sources 
limits their usefulness. Although some triangulation is possible against the CPGB’s 
own archive, awareness among prominent communists of extensive surveillance 
provoked counter-measures including selective record keeping, and reinforced a 
culture of secrecy and mistrust. Thus while the volume of MI5 personal files now 
available has started to generate a significant literature drawing on both sets of 
primary sources,15 investigation of the motives of those involved in the 1956 crisis 
needs also to draw on a substantial specialist secondary literature. Especially relevant 
is work emerging from the ‘biographical turn’ in communist historiography, and work 
that examines both the CPGB’s cultural analysis and the party’s internal culture to 
illuminate the complex and contradictory reality of Zhdanovism’s implementation and 
contestation in the British party.16  
 
Within this research context, this article addresses the Reasoner controversy 
not in retrospect but as it unfolded through the months of 1956 amid the larger party 
crisis, using Thompson’s claim to ‘communist principle’ as a provocation. The first 
section contextualises the use of the MI5 material and considers what it adds to our 
sense of the constraints under which British communists operated. The second locates 
the Reasoner episode within the internal politics and culture of the CPGB, using the 
MI5 material alongside existing sources to illuminate less familiar aspects of a 
controversy that involved careful manoeuvring on both sides.  The final section takes 
up Thompson’s claim to ‘communist principle’, comparing his view of what this 
meant and required with that of a selection of other intellectuals also involved in the 
inner-party debate. This shows significant differences of perspective, even among 
those who supported publication of the Reasoner. The extent to which ‘communist 
principle’ entailed the subordination of individual moral conscience and judgement to 
the perceived interests of the collective was one key issue at stake, but there were also 
political and tactical dimensions to these differences, as well as different 
interpretations of party rules and practices. Interestingly, the positions these 
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intellectuals took on this question of ‘communist principle’ do not map in an 
obviously predictable way onto decisions about whether to leave or remain within the 
party, even after events in Hungary polarized opinion.  This suggests an exceedingly 
complex picture of party experience and commitment in which the impact of ‘1956’ 
was highly differentiated.  
 
Subversion and surveillance 
 
By 1956 Thompson had been under MI5 surveillance for over a decade. An offhand 
remark he made about ‘fighting fascists at home’ on leave during the war in 1943 (a 
year after he had joined the party) was reported by a Buckinghamshire police officer.  
By 1956 MI5 had amassed two files on his activities and those of his wife Dorothy, 
whom he met in 1945. Their contents are mostly trivial (‘Thompson has been seen in 
Siddal district a lot recently during the daytime, giving the impression that he does not 
go out to work, owns an Austin 10 two seater car DKX43. People been seen visiting 
his house in the evenings, some carrying briefcases’)17 which seems fairly typical of 
the genre. In a recent study of surveillance of party writers of the 1930s, James Smith 
evokes the incompetent, philistine and apparently pointless aspects of the British 
state’s monitoring of radical intellectuals, finding little in the files either to suggest 
subversive activity on the part of those being watched, or that those watching grasped 
the significance of their subjects’ intellectual work.18 Yet we should be wary of 
dismissing this as a harmless comedy of errors.  Smith’s wry observation that several 
of these writers’ careers benefited from their communist associations (so long as they 
were prepared to repudiate them later) raises more troubling questions about the 
nature of British anti-communism than it answers. Jennifer Luff offers a contrasting 
perspective. Focusing on the treatment of labour movement communists in the inter-
war period, Luff suggests that the anti-communism of the British ‘secret state’, 
usually viewed as more benign than US McCarthyism, in its insidiousness and 
comprehensive penetration of communist networks was in some ways more 
effective.19 Though ‘open’ intellectual party members were handled differently from 
Luff’s subjects, in files on Thompson, Hilton, Randall Swingler, Christopher Hill and 
others, one nevertheless glimpses more sinister aspects of surveillance amid the trivia. 
We learn, for instance, that the Thompsons’ home in Halifax was broken into and 
clandestinely searched while they were on holiday; that most, if not all, of these party 
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writers featured on a list of some 3000 potential subversives to be preventively 
detained in the event of a breakdown of relations with the USSR; that job offers and 
invitations to contribute to BBC broadcasts might mysteriously evaporate following a 
polite intervention from the security services. Thompson’s rejection for a post as a 
civilian lecturer with Army Northern Command in 1949 was one such episode.20 
There is also the fact that the information released is far from complete, and that the 
procedures for selection of material suitable for public consumption remain opaque.   
 
Responsible use of these records, then, requires some appreciation of their 
significance within the domestic security regime. A few observations afford some 
context for the material consulted.21 First, by the mid-1950s, ‘comprehensive and 
pervasive’ monitoring of communists was firmly in place, the success of 1955’s 
Operation Party Piece granting access to full membership records covering both 
‘open’ and covert members (Styles, 53-4). Bugs and telephone taps on the King Street 
party HQ meant the security services were far better informed than most party 
members about the views and activities of the leadership, and MI5 had also benefited 
from the work of highly placed informers. Second, this surveillance reflected an 
exceedingly malleable and expansive idea of ‘subversion’. If attention to communists 
before the war had been essentially defensive, the main concerns espionage and 
sabotage, the Cold War supplemented these with a more offensive propaganda role, 
more aggressive use of vetting and an expanded role for the IRD.  Third, and with 
specific regard to our group of university dons and writers, comprehensive 
surveillance of these types was undertaken not to counter any specific perceived 
threat, but mainly in an attempt to map their networks, and more nebulously, to 
understand the appeal of communism to intellectuals and students the better to 
counter it.  
 
What impact did this monitoring have for communists like Thompson? 
Certainly party leaders and many individual members were well aware of being 
watched and took steps to counter it.  The existence of espionage networks on both 
sides was known, and there had of course been notorious cases. At the same time, 
most British communists neither engaged in, nor knew much about, the covert side of 
their own party’s activities, and by the 1950s the national and international context for 
such activities, as well as the Soviet and domestic party policy context, was markedly 
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different from the 1930s. Unless, then, one accedes to the wide and indeterminate 
notion of subversion employed by the British state, these intellectuals posed no threat 
to British interests. In fact, by the early 1950s subservience to Moscow was regarded 
by most intellectuals discussed here as the main obstacle to their party’s success in 
Britain, and MI5 were in a good position to know this. As for 1956, a recent study 
concludes that though it monitored the unfolding of the internal party crisis, MI5 
made little effort to capitalise on it to hasten the party’s disintegration, and did not 
always seem fully to grasp its significance.22  The impact of British intelligence 
activity on the crisis seems indirect, and quite possibly undermined the goals of that 
activity. The practices of the state, the vituperation directed at communists in the 
mainstream media, (as well as, of course, much of the language and practice of their 
own party) could hardly fail to reinforce defensive mentalities which, while inimical 
to many communists’ own beliefs and aspirations, were politically (and perhaps 
psychogically) necessary. Shifting such mentalities was not likely to be easy.23 
 
The party and the Reasoner 
‘I never mentioned Lenin’s will, or how Joe ruled his nation,  
and wove my way twixt right and left in every deviation.  
The Party’s line I shall maintain until my dying day sir,  
and whatsoever king may reign, I never will say Nay sir’.24 
 
The way the Reasoner episode unfolded within the CPGB involved considerations of 
political tactics as well as political and moral principle, and occurred against a 
backdrop more complex than standard evocations of the ‘shock’ of the Khrushchev 
‘revelations’ can convey. ‘Stalinism’, as Thompson wrote immediately after the 
Soviet intervention in Hungary in early November, was not ‘wrong things’ about 
which ‘we could not know’ but ‘distorted theories and degenerate practices about 
which we knew something, in which to some degree we shared, and which our 
leadership supports today.’25 He and Saville resigned only after Hungary convinced 
them that the fight to shift the balance of forces and transform the party from within 
through persuasion and carefully calibrated disobedience was futile. Prior to 1956 
they were loyal party members, and though there were instances of both expressing 
misgivings to the leadership on specifics, they were active in their branches and in 
party cultural and educational work, and not thought in any way politically 
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unreliable.26 While there were certainly influences and emphases, mainly deriving 
from the popular front period, that could nurture a critical and humanist outlook 
implicitly at odds with party orthodoxy, the possibilities of organized opposition 
within the party prior to 1956 were limited.  Party cultural groups, to a degree always 
distrusted by the leadership as ‘crucibles of factionalism’27 may have functioned at 
certain times and to some extent as, in Thompson’s words, ‘centres of premature 
revisionism’, 28 pressing the boundaries of orthodoxy and (in the case of some 
members of the writers’ and historians’ groups) developing a more outward-looking 
and creative approach to culture.29 There were, however, well-understood limits, and 
miscreants were usually forced to recant or marginalised.30 Jack Lindsay, guilty of 
perceived deviation in his 1949 Marxism and Contemporary Science, admitted 
‘errors’ due to ‘petty bourgeois conditioning’; ‘I have now published the main lines of 
my self-criticism’.31 Thompson’s recollection of standing by as the editors of Our 
Time Randall Swingler and Edgell Rickword accepted humiliation at the hands of 
cultural secretary Emile Burns is indicative of this ritualized culture of anti-
individualism and ‘self-critique’, as are Doris Lessing’s fictionalised accounts of 
writers’ group meetings in The Golden Notebook. 32(Thompson, 234-5)  
 
 The historians, apparently better organized administratively, seem to have 
negotiated the demands of self-censorship with less mishap than the writers, but the 
same ‘psychological structure’ prevailed. 33 Party intellectuals, though valued and to 
some extent indulged, were also regarded as especially prone to ‘bourgeois 
deviations’ of individualism and ‘moral idealism’. The ‘spineless intellectual’ 
‘parading his conscience’ in ‘objective’ opposition to the interests of the working 
class, the renegade recruited to the ranks of the enemy – these were well-worn tropes 
that left few in doubt that agonies of conscience were a weakness to be negotiated in 
private. Black humour and bitter in-jokes were one release.  A particularly telling 
example is Randall Swingler’s (private) parody of the tortuous ‘self-criticism’ of the 
party:  
 
what we need today is courageous rethinking. But we must not empty out the 
acid-bath with the baby. We must have ‘new’ thinking along the ‘old’ lines. 
There are two kinds of truth, relative truth and creative truth. And we stand for 
creative truth, or making it up as we go along… We have made serious 
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mistakes in the past which must now be corrected. One of the most serious 
was leaving any poets, artists, musicians and such people alive at all.34 
 
There was however a gap between what could be said publicly and what could 
be privately argued between intellectuals and party officials. Letters on MI5 files of 
the early to mid-1950s show intellectuals associated with both groups expressing a 
good deal of criticism of party policy and practice, sometimes quite forthright, but this 
tended to be hedged with protestations of loyalty and admissions of self-doubt. 
Thompson, for example, criticising as ‘disastrous’ party efforts to exert more control 
over literary and cultural coverage in 1952, at the same time referred to himself as 
‘just being Jeremiah’ and hoped to be proved wrong.35 Hilton, in a 1955 letter to a 
local official, lambasted the party leadership’s subjection to the dictates of the CPSU, 
the ‘appalling sectarianism we indulged in from 1946-50 … when I think of the 
eminent persons (including present members of the EC) who discovered, on looking 
back in their memories, that Tito must have been an agent of imperialism during the 
war, I really wonder if I am standing on my arse or my elbow’. Still, he put these 
views ‘diffidently’, confessing himself ‘disoriented politically for the above reasons’. 
There was nothing disoriented in his irate demand ‘are we going to do our own 
thinking, and if so, how are we going to show that we are doing our own thinking?’, 
but habits of euphemism and self-censorship were difficult to break.36 
 
Yet change was afoot. The Khrushchev disclosures happened against a 
backdrop of disorientation in the British party about the meaning and extent of de-
stalinisation.  Though reaction to Stalin’s death in 1953 was carefully orchestrated, 
the ‘rehabilitation’ of Tito, well-substantiated rumours about anti-semitism, the 
execution of Lavrenti Beria, amongst other developments, spoke of a CPSU in great 
flux. Used to being told what to think, the leadership reacted slowly and confusedly to 
the new situation. The Daily Worker did its best to carry on as normal– at precisely 
the same time when readers were writing in numbers to ask when there would be any 
accounting of the Khrushchev speech it ran extensive upbeat coverage of his 
diplomatic visit to England with Bulganin (itself indicative of a changed context).  
But the readers’ forum page told of grave concern from all sections of the party (not 
just intellectuals), not only about events in the Soviet Union but about British party 
practices and structures that had produced a loyalty to the CPSU so complete as to 
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collude in cover-up and falsification over many years. A partial debate on the basis of 
incomplete information about the content of the speech through March was 
prematurely closed, just before the full text was leaked.37 Failure to discuss the issues 
in open session at the 24th Congress at the end of March intensified demands for an 
explanation, but the leadership equivocated. It accepted the threadbare excuse of the 
‘cult of personality’, declared full confidence in the CPSU courageously to correct 
past ‘mistakes’, asserted that ‘full collective leadership’ had been restored and that an 
‘exceptionally healthy situation’ now existed.38  As disquiet mounted, General 
Secretary Harry Pollitt’s account of the implications of the 20th Congress, published 
in late April, stolid but in a limited way reflective, was followed in May by Palme 
Dutt’s notorious comparison of Stalin’s abuses to ‘spots on the sun’ and portentous 
reminder to ‘ivory tower dwellers in fairyland’ that the ‘thorny path of human 
advance’ involved both ‘unexampled heroism’, and ‘baseness, tears and blood’.39 
Dutt’s crassness provoked an outcry and promise of a ‘more helpful’ rejoinder. 40 
 
Unable to react flexibly and intelligently enough to the different demands on it 
or to bring into clear focus the implications of fast-moving events, the leadership 
could neither contain debate nor get control of it. This demonstration of weakness 
enabled those who saw the Khrushchev speech as an opportunity for party renewal 
and reform to seize the initiative. Already through March, Thompson had been 
writing in increasingly provocative terms to Bert Ramelson and James Klugmann (a 
member of the party executive committee and author of From Trotsky to Tito, an 
abject justification of Soviet policy withdrawn in 1956) both of whom he was on 
friendly terms with and whom he hoped might shift their positions to alter the 
complexion of the leadership.41 Describing the leadership as ‘opportunist and lacking 
in socialist principle’, and questioning Klugmann’s own record, Thompson admitted 
he was moving into a position of opposition within the party, and suggested those 
‘most responsible for selling the Stalin lines’ should resign or temporarily retire at the 
congress, making way for comrades ‘known and trusted in the districts’, as a first step 
toward a deeper process of renewal.42 On 22 March he wrote to Harry Pollitt 
suggesting the 24th congress be followed within a year by a 25th or emergency 
congress.43 In early April, a day after having sent Saville a savagely parodic ‘official 
letter’ mocking the style of party discussion, he wrote Pollitt that he was ‘desperately 
disappointed at what I have learned so far of our Congress’.44 Saville addressed John 
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Gollan, soon to replace the under-pressure Pollitt as general secretary, in stronger 
terms, describing the congress as a ‘fiasco’: ‘I now find it impossible to stand up in 
public and defend party policy, and unless I and those who think like me can effect 
some measure of change, I for one shall be forced to resign’.45 The two now began to 
coordinate their activities closely. Both were members of the party historians group, 
chaired by Eric Hobsbawm, though Saville was more active within it.  On 8 April he 
attended an extended meeting of the group’s committee that debated the implications 
of the 20th Congress in a discussion opened by Klugmann, whose own compromised 
position was clear to all. Resolutions were passed expressing ‘profound 
dissatisfaction’ with the British party congress, calling on the leadership to make ‘a 
public statement of regret for the British party’s past uncritical endorsement of all 
Soviet policies and views’ and to initiate the ‘widest possible public discussion of all 
the problems involved for the British party in the present situation’.46 At the same 
time Thompson resigned from the Yorkshire District committee, declaring himself 
opposed on a number of fundamental points to the theory and general line of the 
party.47 A long resolution drafted by him and passed by the Halifax branch made 
similar demands to the historians’ group resolution.48 
 
By mid-April it was becoming clear that the Yorkshire comrades were laying 
down a challenge to the leadership. Although couched at this point mainly in terms of 
‘opposition rights’ to express opinion freely in the party press, both sides understood 
that the stakes were higher. Anxious to head off a wider revolt, the leadership tried to 
placate the ringleaders. In an (intercepted) phonecall Gollan asked Ramelson to do all 
he could to persuade Thompson to ‘stay where he was’ and withdraw his resignation 
from the District Committee.49 Ramelson’s efforts through May extended to inviting 
Thompson to make proposals for pieces for publication. Thompson sent in a draft of a 
‘minimum statement’ to be published by the Executive Committee.50 Though the 
resolution actually published fell far short of Thompson’s suggestions (it admitted a 
‘certain dogmatism, rigidity and sectarianism’ in party work in the British labour 
movement, hived off questions of reform to a ‘special commission’ that would 
eventually exonerate the leadership, and while acknowledging ‘abuses and grave 
injustices’ in the USSR dodged the question of its own responsibility, blaming ‘false 
information’) he and Saville now secured space in the party press.51 Saville’s pithy 
contribution took aim at Dutt: ‘if the crimes we now know of were historically 
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necessary, the man in the street is entitled to say ‘Not for me brother!’ and I would 
agree with him.’ With ‘our political honesty as a political party’ at stake, nothing less 
than a full accounting would suffice.52  Thompson meanwhile was at work on a longer 
contribution, having pushed via Ramelson and Arnold Kettle the idea of a ‘polemical 
article on the moral issue’ that would appear in World News at the end of June as 
‘Winter Wheat in Omsk’.53 By late May the leadership expected a cessation of 
hostilities; a bugged conversation between assistant general secretary George 
Matthews and Klugmann has Matthews reporting that Thompson had been asked ‘to 
write down quite logically and clearly what it was that he wanted, and it had not been 
too bad. He also said that he thought Savill [sic] would quieten down now his letter 
had been published’.54 Ramelson could have told them differently a few days later, 
having received the letter that sparked MI5 interest. In it Thompson recognized 
‘definite concessions to our point of view’ in the EC resolution, but saw no 
commitment to genuine change, only a ‘safety valve’ opened by a ‘bureaucracy in 
whose interest it is to prevent too close an examination of their past actions’.   
 
Now you inform me that W[orld] N[ews] is closing down on real controversy 
in a week or two, and the predetermined discussion is starting, on unity. All I 
can say is, Thank God there is no chance of this EC ever having power in 
Britain: it would destroy in a month every liberty of thought, conscience and 
expression which it has taken the British people 300 odd years to win. And it 
would do it all with benevolent safety valves and in a smug and supremely 
self-righteous belief that it was acting in the interests of the working class, 
whose interests it was divinely inspired to interpret’.55 
 
Throwing in personal criticism of Ramelson, as a disingenuous philistine susceptible 
to the ‘bloody awful tradition of dogma and the priesthood’, Thompson could hardly 
expect a positive response to his demand for ‘full controversy in a discussion journal’ 
under editorship including oppositional elements. ‘If the EC wishes to close up World 
News etc, I and others will in time find the means to circulate or publish our ideas’. 
He was also explicit that his points of disagreement were now so fundamental as to 
‘lead on to a demand for change in policy and personnel so far-reaching that at the 
moment they are quite impracticable’. Through June and early July he and Saville 
planned the first Reasoner and canvassed support among a network of contacts which 
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included rank-and-file party members and regional officials as well as intellectuals. ‘I 
don’t think our party has got a chance unless we have a public fight to change the 
leadership at once’, wrote Thompson to Howard Hill, District Secretary for Sheffield, 
and a party official whom he respected.56 And to another comrade ‘We feel it is now 
or never, and that our position is fairly strong at the moment’.57 
 
 Publication of The Reasoner (noted in Tribune on 20 July under the heading 
‘Opposition group start paper in CP’) opened a new phase in the party crisis that   
needed delicate handling on both sides. Since Thompson and Saville’s aim was to 
force a discussion that would shift the balance of forces toward reform, they chose the 
ground of their challenge carefully to avoid alienating potential supporters and 
triggering immediate disciplinary sanctions. While publishing in the non-party press 
would certainly have been regarded as disloyalty, they judged that the rules around 
independent party publications were unclear enough to afford a little time.58  To avoid 
implicating others, production and distribution of 650 hand-duplicated copies was 
managed entirely by the editors. Under the motto ‘to leave error unrefuted is to 
encourage intellectual immorality’ the journal was ‘written by and addressed to 
members of the Communist Party’. It contained two editorials, a critique of 
democratic centralism by Ken Alexander (a close collaborator later on the board of 
the New Reasoner), and documents and correspondence from Party contacts abroad, 
to place the British party’s hidebound response to the crisis in broader context. John 
Gollan (away with other EC members on an - ironically timed - trip to Moscow) was 
sent a copy with a cordial note from Saville blandly rebutting ‘any suggestion of 
factionalism’ and insisting ‘we have no aim except to provide an additional forum for 
discussion’.59 
 
The most substantial piece in the first issue was by Thompson, developing the 
case for rethinking attitudes to morality that ‘Winter Wheat in Omsk’ first put. 
‘Winter Wheat’ argued that moral concern could no longer be belittled as the preserve 
of Dutt’s fairyland dwellers, nor trumped by expediency: ‘we are concerned not with 
pure consciences, but with honesty and good faith in our actions, not with absolute 
and ideal integrity but with Communist principle in our methods, socialist integrity on 
our political relations’. Anticipating themes later developed as ‘socialist humanism’ 
Thompson urged the party to rid itself of the ‘silly, mechanical view that morality is 
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something to do with idealism’, embrace ‘conscious struggle for moral principle in 
our political work’ and recognize the value of basic democratic liberties. ‘The British 
people do not understand and will not trust a monolith without a moral tongue’. So 
incendiary was this critique that it appeared with a reply from George Matthews, 
reminding Thompson that ‘for Marxists every political decision is good or bad 
according to whether or not it serves the interests of the working people’ and 
mounting a by-now familiar defence of the leadership, whose ‘past attitudes’ to the 
SU had resulted not from lack of moral principle but from ‘lack of information’ or 
‘wrong information’.60 Thompson now rejoined the fray to demolish Matthews’ case 
and mount a bolder attack on the habits of sectarianism, the practices of centralism, 
and the distortion of Marxism. Admitting their own ‘share [of] responsibility for the 
failures which we analyse’, the editors restated their commitment to Marxism and 
communism and urged the leadership to make the full and explicit break with 
Stalinism the moment demanded.61  
 
That the leadership did not do so is a matter of record. Rules were invoked and 
the comrades requested (initially by the Yorkshire District Committee) to cease 
publication. Having refused they were summoned to meet the Political Committee at 
King Street on 31 August. Here they reiterated their refusal to close unless guarantees 
for minority rights and free discussion were given. Guarantees were not forthcoming, 
although there was still some attempt to conciliate: Thompson recalled that Gollan 
and Matthews ‘as good as admitted there had been wide suppression in our press, and 
that this had been a mistake’, and while insisting they put an end to the Reasoner, 
invited the pair to put proposals for continuing the discussion before the EC.62 The 
second, September, issue was carefully timed to appear the day before the Executive 
Committee meeting issued an explicit instruction to close or face disciplinary 
sanction. Even now, the editors were hopeful of concessions, deciding to pause 
publication after a third issue, in a holding manoeuvre they hoped might yet pressure 
the leadership into allowing a full debate, while they appealed their inevitable 
suspension.  The final Reasoner included an editorial (dated 31 October) announcing 
closure in order to give way to a ‘serious socialist journal’ with a larger board, urging 
the Party leadership to ‘take steps adequate to the political crisis and itself … initiate 
the formation of such a journal.’63  
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For its part, the Executive Committee undertook a careful temperature-testing 
of party feeling about the Reasoner controversy to inform its next move. A document 
summarizing representations and resolutions made by party branches and groups 
reveals that disquiet was by no means confined to intellectuals but at the same time 
indicated partial success for the leadership’s strategy. Thirty-eight representations 
supported the EC’s instruction to close, though many qualified this by urging space 
for discussion in the party press, launch of a new party discussion journal, or 
postponement of disciplinary action until matters could be fought out at the next 
congress. Seventeen representations opposing the EC’s position were received, 
including from the writers’ group (‘in favour of independent publication, against EC 
statement, against disciplinary action’). Shawfields branch in Glasgow ‘deplored’ the 
EC instruction, while a group of Sheffield Graduates were recorded as ‘urging T&S to 
continue publication and offering to help them do so’. Among the ‘non-committals’ 
were the historians group, who opposed disciplinary action but at the same time asked 
the editors not to publish a third number.64  
 
This game of tactics might have continued for some time longer, although the 
leadership felt it now had the upper hand. In the event, the Reasoner controversy was 
truncated as events in Hungary showed the limits of ‘de-stalinisation’. The British 
party decision to accept - against the eyewitness reports of Daily Worker journalist 
Peter Fryer, whose speaking out resulted in his expulsion - the Soviet line that 
military intervention was undertaken not to suppress popular revolt but to prevent 
counter-revolution and fascism polarized the situation. As Soviet tanks moved into 
Budapest to begin the second, decisive intervention on 4 November, the British 
leadership, notwithstanding an agonized meeting, passed a resolution that suppressed 
what they knew in favour of full support of the Soviet action. ‘The socialist system is 
being saved. The restoration of fascism is being prevented’ it declared.65 Outraged at 
the suppression of Fryer’s reports, many Daily Worker staffers joined the next wave 
of resignees.66 The Reasoner editors’ efforts to conciliate and shift the party attitude 
from within were now redundant. With Saville just duplicating the third issue, 
including Thompson’s ‘Through the smoke of Budapest’, a passionate appeal for 
solidarity with the people of Hungary, there was time only to include a jointly-worded 
new editorial. This declared that ‘the crisis in world communism is now different in 
kind’ and marked ‘a crucial turning point for our party’. It demanded the EC 
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dissociate itself from Soviet actions, call for the withdrawal of troops, declare 
solidarity with the Polish Workers’ Party and call immediate district congresses in 
preparation for a national Congress. With no hope of this occurring, it added ‘we urge 
all those who, like ourselves, will dissociate themselves completely from the 
leadership of the British Communist Party, not to lose faith in socialism, and to find 
ways of keeping together’.67 A few days after the EC moved to suspend Thompson 
and Saville on 11 November, they resigned. MI5 intercepted the party card that 
Thompson returned to Ramelson.  
 
Intellectuals and ‘communist principle’ 
‘We believe that in our attempts to promote a serious discussion of Communist 
theory, we, and not the Executive Committee, have been defending Communist 
principle’.68   
 
Hungary and the British leadership’s stance on it turned a stream of 
resignations into a flood. Yet one should be wary of assuming that the demands of 
‘communist principle’ were self-evident, even in this more polarized situation, or that 
the decision to leave or to remain within the party betokened a clear dividing line. In 
making their challenge on grounds of ‘communist principle’, Thompson and Saville 
were evoking a range of meanings. ‘Communist principle’ implied distinction from 
and rejection of ‘bourgeois’ notions of abstract, universal moral principle. It entailed 
in practice, as we have seen, a commitment to self-discipline, the active suppression 
of individualism in pursuit of the collective interest. As such it could readily be 
mobilized against doubters, especially intellectuals, and for unity at all costs. Yet it 
also contained ideas of adherence to methodological principles of collective work, 
theoretical clarification, discussion and self-criticism.  As the Reasoner affair 
proceeded, Thompson became firmer, or at least more forthright, in his view that the 
suppression of individuality, morality and conscience was an alien importation with 
disastrous consequences, reparable however through recovery of homegrown 
traditions preceding but compatible with Marx. “Give me the liberty to know, to utter, 
and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties’, he demanded, via 
Milton, in ‘Winter Wheat in Omsk’. Interestingly, while there is no suggestion that 
Saville disagreed with such an emphasis, his own invocations of ‘communist 
principle’ were almost invariably more pragmatic and tactical.  
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The positions of other oppositionally-minded intellectuals in the Reasoner 
controversy show a range of perspectives about what ‘communist principle’ might 
require, and in many cases these were argued out with the editors, whose 
correspondence shows ample recognition of the competing imperatives at play for 
each individual. Randall Swingler, a confidant of Thompson’s who had resigned after 
attending the 24th Congress, was supportive of his friend’s efforts but thought by 
making independent publication rights the issue they were ‘narrowing the point of 
attack’ and would be outmanoeuvred by the ‘long outdated little clique’ in King St 
(Croft: 226, 228). For him the party was irredeemable, and though he later joined the 
New Reasoner board, he remained aloof from the New Left, a marginal, largely 
ignored figure among the panoply of ex-communists.  Lindsay, already viewed with 
suspicion in party circles, and like Thompson involved with both the writers’ and 
historians’ groups, took a different tack, attempting to act as a ‘moderating influence’ 
in the crisis.69 In April he had urged on Pollitt regarding the Khrushchev revelations 
the need for ‘sensitivity to the full issue and its possibilities’, but after the Reasoner 
appeared wrote (jointly with Maurice Cornforth and Jack Beeching) a letter to its 
editors urging them to respect party discipline. ‘Do you honestly expect to find a 
better party elsewhere?’ expressed the nub of the issue as he saw it.70  Lindsay stayed 
in, though he argued against suspending Saville and Thompson and strongly protested 
the EC position on Hungary.71 His sense of being torn in different directions by the 
crisis was dramatized with heartfelt acuteness by Doris Lessing in The Golden 
Notebook. Though her first contribution to the Reasoner warned about seeming to 
become an ‘intellectuals’ revolt’ scapegoating the leadership, she was among the 
closest to Thompson in putting the question of individual conscience to the forefront. 
Stalinism resulted not from an ‘excess of individualism’, but its opposite. ‘The 
safeguard against tyranny, now, as it always has been, is to sharpen individuality, to 
strengthen individual responsibility, and not to delegate it’.72 In December she 
resigned and, enclosing a copy of her resignation letter to Saville, told him she was 
beginning ‘an incredibly witty and ideological novel which I only began inspired by 
the idea of you people starting a magazine’.73 
 
The historians’ group, despite its reputation, had no unanimity of view on the 
Reasoner controversy, although its demand that the leadership facilitate a ‘serious’ 
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party history was an obvious provocation.74 Apart from the Thompsons and Saville, 
only Hilton contributed to the published Reasoner.  His contribution, while 
supportive, warned that discussion should not be confined to intellectuals but must 
aim at overcoming the mistrust of non-communists in the labour movement. As the 
affair proceeded, his support intensified, and he more than once urged the editors to 
continue publishing even at the cost of expulsion.75 After Hungary, he and 
Christopher Hill were the main instigators of a letter published in the New Statesman 
on 1 December after The Daily Worker refused it. Condemning the British 
leadership’s ‘uncritical support’ of the Soviet action in Hungary, as the ‘undesirable 
culmination of years of distortion of fact’, it is sometimes identified with the 
historians group but was in fact signed by a range of party intellectuals including 
Hobsbawm, Victor Kiernan, Lindsay and EA Thompson, but also Lessing, Chimen 
Abramsky, Ron Meek and George Houston (who had produced the ‘Rhyming 
Reasoner’), Hyman Levy, Paul Hogarth, Robert Browning and Henry Collins.76 MI5 
telechecks on King Street show Matthews summoned from a meeting to speak to 
Daily Worker editor Campbell on 20 November about the letter, and that by 23rd a 
tortuous justification had been found for refusing it. ‘Hitherto controversial letters 
have either been signed by individuals or by groups of people in the same branch or 
locality’ wrote Campbell to Hill; printing it would therefore establish a new principle. 
Hill apparently reacted ‘coldly’ to this news, and warned that it would be sent 
elsewhere.77 Hilton resigned soon after, according to a report of an intercepted 
conversation; ‘Saville tells Ralph [Raphael Samuel] that Rodney is resigning, he is 
joining the Labour Party but is doing so (?resigning) without any fuss.78 Hill stayed to 
complete a critical minority report for the party’s commission on inner–party 
democracy. His position on the Reasoner was that Thompson and Saville should have 
done more to get their views published in the party press, and he declined to 
subscribe.79 Thompson, regretting this, surmised to Hilton that Hill’s position as a 
reader of Russian might incline him to a view that ‘he should bear as much guilt as 
anyone, and should stand beside them’.80 Hill resigned after having tried, and failed, 
to shift the party at the next congress. 
 
 Other group members took a variety of paths; the young Raphael Samuel left 
in 1956, he and Kiernan (who left in 1959) were both involved with the New Left. 
Medievalist E.A Thompson left in 1956. Brian Pearce published a pseudonymous 
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pamphlet under the imprint of the New Reasoner in 1957, he soon after joined Gerry 
Healy and Peter Fryer’s Trotskyist Newsletter group and was expelled from the CP.81  
Among those who stayed in the party (often earlier recruits than the leavers) were 
A.L. Morton, Maurice Dobb, Betty Grant and Klugmann, Dona Torr, acknowledged 
by many on the group as a major influence, died in 1957 having taken no part in the 
controversy. As for the chair of the group, Hobsbawm, he was one of the very few 
intellectuals to remain in the party for the long haul while also establishing a 
formidable independent reputation. Friendly with SavilleHobsbawm subscribed to the 
Reasoner despite finding its criticisms insufficiently constructive.82 Minutes of the 
historians’ group through 1956 show that he did what he could within the bounds of 
party discipline to support open discussion. A proposal he made in late 1956 to widen 
the membership and activities of the group beyond party lines was certainly partly 
designed to make good on his promise to resist any attempt to exclude Thompson and 
Saville from it, (as well perhaps as to provide a more credible base for his own 
historical work), and he contributed an essay on Marx to the first New Reasoner.83 
Hobsbawm signed the New Statesman letter, but his individual correspondence was 
more forgiving of the leadership, describing the Soviet intervention as a ‘at best, a 
tragic necessity’ of which he approved ‘albeit with a heavy heart’.84 Such a balancing 
act irritated both loyalists and leavers, but fell short of provoking expulsion in a 
weakened party.   
 
A final word goes to an anonymous remainer, a member of the party cultural 
committee who in late 1957 wrote a document opening discussion on Declaration, a 
collection of essays revitalizing a longer-running debate around artistic and 
intellectual ‘commitment’. The book was mocked as sentimental in the Daily Worker, 
but this writer engaged seriously with the argument of contributor Doris Lessing, that 
communism involved a basic ethical conflict between what is due to the collective 
and what to the individual.  In words that might have passed muster with Thompson, 
he wrote:  
 
I believe Doris Lessing is right when she says that a writer must speak with 
his small personal voice … I believe that if what he wants to say in this 
personal voice conflicts with the party line then he must still say it. For it is 
not culture that must serve the party, it is the Party that must serve culture … 
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This question of the relation between the individual and collective is the 
deepest problem of the socialist revolution. We have skirted round it, we have 
never faced it, and so we have shown ourselves indifferent to it. That I believe 




The dissidents of 1956, whether they left or remained, interpreted the demands of 
‘communist principle’ in ways that were highly specific and individualized. This 
points to a complex picture of experience and commitment, adding weight to 
established arguments for acute sensitivity to the diversity of biographical and other 
contexts in party history. The MI5 files on these figures accord occasional flashes of 
insight but overall give little indication that the indiscriminately extensive 
surveillance indulged in brought them much nearer to understanding the reasons for 
communist allegiance among these intellectuals, nor why some would leave and 
others remain. For this one needs to engage in ‘imaginative understanding’, 
‘thoughtful reflection grounded in historical evidence about the ideologies, cultures 
and experiences our subjects inhabited’.86 If Thompson’s appeal to conscience and 
humanity crystallised doubts for many, there were also those for whom this was 
politically naïve, and while a decision to leave the party can look obvious in 
retrospect, it was often not so at the time. As for Thompson himself, the released files 
add a little to our sense of his biography and confirm some continuities in his 
thinking, especially his concern with traditions of English moral radicalism. Although 
doing little to support any view of him as a strong voice of criticism inside the party 
prior to 1956, they help demonstrate the existence of a critically-minded subculture, a 
network of incipient dissidence that made the Reasoner episode possible. Critical 
attitudes were by no means confined to party intellectuals, let alone to one particular 
group, and the Reasoner drew support from many ‘ordinary’ party members. Yet the 
ability of the party partially to tolerate and contain these oppositional tendencies 
complicates the picture. 1956 for Thompson was life-changing in a way that differed 
even from his closest contemporaries like Saville and Swingler. His oft-quoted pun 
that he ‘commenced to reason’ in 1956 referenced the Reasoner episode but could not 
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